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COPYRIGHT IN LEGAL DOCUMENTS0
By DAVID VAVER*
Original legal documents and forms have long enjoyed copyright protection.
After looking at Commonwealth and U.S. decisions, the author discusses the
nature, extent, and desirability of protection. An examination of the
technicalities of copyright protection reveals a law drafted in broad generalities
and ill-suited to respond adequately to the common practices arising from this
class and, by implication, other classes of creative work. The author concludes
by suggesting practical ways in which legislators, lawyers, and judges can solve
some of the copyright problems generated through the use of legal documents.

[Take the] case of a client who goes to his solicitor to draw a will, assuming that the
instructions do not exclude the will when drawn from being an original literary work, is it
to be said that the solicitor thereby has a copyright in another man's will during his
lifetime and is entitled to the rights which the statute gives to the owner of a copyright?
The whole idea seems to me absolutely absurd.1
-Mr. Justice Astbury
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the course of their daily business, lawyers routinely produce a
variety of documents-contracts, deeds, wills, court papers-which
create, regulate, protect, or initiate legal relationships or commercial
transactions. Lay and professional people also produce such documents,
which may later be redrafted, edited, or vetted by lawyers.
Many of these documents are not drafted from scratch. Instead,
the drafter has a precedent or legal form upon which the writing is
based. This is even more common today with the widespread use of doit-yourself legal kits and computerized databases, which make standard
forms and clauses available to both lawyers and laypeople.
How the law of copyright touches on these activities is not well
understood. Some might be surprised to learn that the legal issues
surrounding such a common activity, as the assembly of documents from
various sources, is far from clear. The reported litigation from various
parts of the Commonwealth and the United States is enough to create
anxiety, while leaving many critical issues unsettled. This paper
therefore considers some problems involved in granting or denying
copyright to legal documents.
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II. QUALIFYING FOR COPYRIGHT
Ordinary letters and printed forms, like questionnaires and
business blanks, have long been protected by copyright 2 There is,
apparently, little thought of changing this position. This is not as odd as
it at first seems. Copyright was originally conceived or justified as a
means to encourage the production and dissemination of literature, but
eventually descended into a reductionist and generalizing tendency.
Thus, anything written or stabilized in some way is protected, however
mundane it may be, whatever its function or its economic or social
purpose. What else can an ordinary business letter or memorandum,
taking a few minutes to compose; and a computer programme, taking
months and millions of dollars to develop, have in common? Yet
copyright law treats both indiscriminately as literary works and protects
both to the hilt.
In Canada, the most recent blueprint for copyright law reform, A
Charter of Rights for Creators (1985),3 endorsed this approach. It
recommended, for example, that business forms should continue to be
protected as literary works, although Canadian form makers told the
parliamentary committee producing this report that the law inhibited
their ability to compete in Canada with American form makers.
American firms cannot stop their forms from being reproduced in their
home country but can stop this activity in Canada.4 Canadian policymakers apparently thought the pristine purity of copyright theory, as
they conceived it, should stay untainted by anything as crass as
economics. The North American Free TradeAgreement (NAFTA) and its
implementing legislation changed nothing.5 It allowed American form
makers to continue to reproduce Canadian forms in the U.S., while
preventing Canadians from reproducing American forms in Canada. A
trade restriction can slip unnoticed through the free trade cordon so
long as it fles the flag of copyright.
2

Church v. Linton (1894), 2 C.C.LR. 176 at 179 (Ont. H.C.J.);Ladawv.Lear (1898), 30 O.R.
26 (Div. Ct.);British Oxygen Co. v. LiquidAirLtcL, [1925] Ch. 383 [hereinafterBitish Oxygen]; Beloff
v. Pressdram Ltd. (1972), [1973] 1 All E.R. 241 (Ch.); and Bulman Group Ltd. v. "One Write"
Accounting Systems Ltd (1982), 62 C.P.R. (2d) 149 (F.C.T.D.).
3 Report of the Subcommittee on the Revision of Copyright, Standing Committee on
Communications and Culture (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 10 October 1985) at 17 [hereinafter Charter
ofRights].
4 See D. Vaver, "Copyright Phase 2: The New Horizon" (1991) 6 I.P.J. 37 at 42-43.
5 See the NorthAmerican Free Trade Implementation Act, S.C. 1993, c. 44, effective 1 January
1994 [hereinafter NAFTA Act].
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If ordinary business forms and letters are protected in Canada, it
follows that legal documents also qualify as "literary works." Though
not aspiring toward literature, they are writings and therefore "literary;"
if "original," they are entitled to copyright. 6 A Scottish judge of the last
century observed, not entirely tongue-in-cheek, that lawyers "esteem
such works far above the products of the most brilliant imagination or
profound science-finding them, no doubt, greatly more useful."'7 Still,
the sort of protection legal documents deserve should, as is indicated
below, differ from that extended to works of literature and learning.
Legal documents may also fall into other copyright
classifications. A legal document consisting mainly of provisions found
in earlier documents may qualify as a "compilation." The compilation
will be classified as a literary work.8 A document may form part of a
larger document, for example, a quotation, order, or application form, or
a collection of forms, in which case, it will come under the umbrella of
whatever copyright protection the larger document has.
The extent of protection may depend on the classification. For
example, a compilation of out-of-copyright documents may be protected
by copyright if skill and judgment were required to produce it, but only
the selection, structure, and ordering of the material, rather than the
forms themselves, will have copyright. Anybody can take any documents
from the compilation, but a rival compilation cannot copy a substantial
part of the earlier selection.
The sort of dispute that may arise is easily envisaged. For
example, a commercial publisher of legal forms may object to another
publisher copying and selling them. The copyright owner of a published
book of forms may complain about a rival's copying. A lawyer may wish
to stop a form she devised from being used commercially. One would
expect these different business situations to receive different legal
treatment. This, as we shall see, does not always happen.
A. Authors and Owners
It is always necessary to identify the author of any work for which
copyright protection is claimed. The author is a central figure in
6 CopyrightAct,R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, s. 5(1).
7

Alexanderv. Mackenzie (1847), 9 Sess. Cas. 748 at 754, note 3 (Scot.) [hereinafterAleander].
8 CapitalFinance Co. v. Lombank Ltd., [1964] R.P.C. 467 at 468-69 (Scot.) [hereinafter
Lombank]. See also the new definition of "compilation" in ss. 2 and 2.1 of the CopyightAct, supra
note 6, as inserted by the NAFTA Ac4 supra note 5.
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copyright law. Title or root of title is generally established through her;
the duration of copyright is generally the author's life plus 50 years; and
the author has certain "moral rights," even where she is not the
copyright owner, allowing her to claim a by-line and prevent prejudicial
changes to her work. And, for a work to have copyright in Canada, its
author must qualify as a Commonwealth national or a national from a
state that is a member of the Berne or Universal Copyright Conventions,
or the work must be first published in one of these countries. 9
Identifying authorship is sometimes tricky. In the simplest case,
the author of a legal document is its drafter or compiler. Where the
work is a book of forms, its author is whoever selects and organizes the
forms.
The author is the first copyright owner. The exception is where
she produces documents as part of her duties as an employee (for
example, an in-house lawyer), in which case the employer is the first
owner. 10
A client who hires a lawyer for legal work in the usual way does
not own copyright in any legal documents the lawyer produces; the
lawyer does. Whether on retainer or hiired for a single task, a lawyer
does not work for wages or salary and so is not her client's employee. 11
She may, of course, specifically agree to transfer her copyright to the
client, but an agreement like this is not implied from the fact that she
may be paid to produce the document. Otherwise, lawyers could not
effectively serve clients because they could not repeat documents or
provisions over which former clients held copyrights.
On the other hand, a lawyer unfamiliar with a particular activity
may adapt forms provided by the client to the client's particular
situation. The client may express preferences but, if the lawyer
ultimately chooses the words and takes responsibility for them, she is the
sole owner of copyright in the document. 2 The situation differs where a
client produces his own wording, and the lawyer gives it automatic
approval or makes minor changes. In this instance, the lawyer acquires
no interest in the client's copyright. Lengthy or significant changes may,
as we shall see shortly, make the lawyer a joint author; but assuming
9 Copyright Ac4 ibid., ss. 5(1), (1.1), and (2), as amended by the NAFTA Ac4 ibid., s. 57(1).
Note that work produced by a non-Berne national (for example, a citizen of the People's Republic
of China, before it became a member of the Berne Convention) may be unprotected in Canada.
10 CopyrightAct, ibid., ss. 13(1) and (3).
11

Arcon Can. Inc. v.ArcobecAluminium Inc. (1984), 5 C.I.P.R. 94 at 106-07 (Qu6. C.S.).
Debina Corp. v. Triolet Systems Inc. (1993), 47 C.P.R. (3d) 1 at 46-47 (Ont. CL Gen. Div.)
[hereinafter Delrina].
12
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ultimate legal and professional responsibility for wording does not make
anyone an author. In copyright law, the status of author is reserved for

someone responsible for putting ideas into written form, not someone
providing the actual ideas.J1 3
B. JointProductions
Legal documents, produced through the input of two or more
people, can create authorship and ownership complexities. For example,
in negotiating a contract, A may proffer a ten-clause agreement. B likes
it all, except clause ten. He proposes a substitute; A agrees. If clauses
one to nine and clause ten all qualify as original, the result is two
separate copyrights: one based on A's authorship of clause one through
nine, the other on B's authorship of clause ten.14 The same result
follows if, instead of accepting B's proposal outright, A proposes minor
changes of expression, to which B agrees. 15 But if A proposes major
changes of expression-major enough to qualify them independently as
an original work-she may then share joint authorship of clause 10 with
B. 16
B can claim authorship or joint authorship only if he contributes
actual wording. Suppose B objects to A's clause ten, giving reasons, and
A supplies a substitute clause that overcomes the objection. A, not B,
has authored clause ten. "Ideas people" are not authors unless they
express their ideas in writing. 17
Matters can become more complicated. For example,
negotiators may build up a document by give-and-take. At the end of
the day, no one knows who contributed what. Copyright in the
13 Donoghue v.Allied NewspapersLtd (1937), [1938] Ch. 106.
14 Single words, even neologisms, are treated as the basic building blocks of language and so
cannot be the preserve of any one person. But the product of even modest compositional skill can
have copyright: witness the six-sentence business letter, containing an offer to sell, protected from
reproduction in British Oxygen, supra note 2.
15
FAIInsurancesLtd v.Advance Bank Australia Ltd. (1986), 68 Aust. L.R. 133 at 140 (Fed.
Ct. of Australia) [hereinafter FAIInsurances].
16
A joint author collaborates in the common design of a work by contributing material that is
(a) not distinct from the contribution of the other author(s), and (b) substantial enough on its own
to have copyright. See Copyright Act, supra note 6, s. 2 for the definition of "work of joint
authorship;" Kantel v. Grant, [1933] Ex. C.R. 84 at 92-94;Ashmore v. Douglas-Home (1982), [1987]
F.S.R. 553 at 560 (Ch.); and Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Ross, 16 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1541 at 1546 and following
(9th Cir. 1990).
17

See note 16.

Copyrightin Legal Documents

1993]

agreement then is jointly authored and co-owned by the negotiators or
their respective employers. In another situation, a client may supply
forms to a lawyer to help her produce a document suitable for his needs.
A lawyer who then assembles a form from the best clauses she can find,
whether in the supplied documents or her own form books, is the author
of a fresh compilation. The client who has supplied the raw material
does not share in the authorship, any more than a parts supplier owns an
18
interest in an automobile assembled from them.
A joint owner of copyright retains considerable power. She may
claim an injunction against an infringer without joining her co-owner,
and can get damages or an account of profits to the extent of her
interest. She can even stop her co-owner from exploiting the work-for
example, by including the document in a published book of
precedents-without her consent.1 9 If she does not have any interest in
the copyright (because, for example, her employer owns it), a joint
author may still be able to assert her moral rights, such as her right to be
identified as joint author where another claims sole credit 2 0
C. Originality
To be protected, a legal document must be original. If the work
is a book of forms, originality may be found in such skill or labour as has
gone into selecting and organizing the material.
Commonwealth judges find originality quite easily. In Scotland,
for example, a set of forms a lawyer drafted to conform to the
requirements of new legislation,21 and finance agreements designed to
exploit tax loopholes and presumably also drafted by a lawyer, 22 have
been found original. Elsewhere, courts have denied protection where
the material, or its order or design, is simply reproduced from
legislation,23 or where a work is routinely assembled from obvious
18

Deajj

supra note 12.

19

Massie & Renwick Ltd. v. Undenwriters'Survey Bureau,Ltd, [1940] S.C.P. 218 at 243; Prior v.
Lansdowne Press Pry Ltd. (1975), 12 Aust. L.R. 685 at 688 (S.C. of Victoria); and Cescinsky v. Geo.
Routledge & Sons, Ld., [1916] 2 KB. 325.
20
See text below, accompanying note 31.
21

Alexander, supra note 7.

22 Lombank, supra note 8 at 469; and Capital Finance Co. v. Bowmaker (Commercial) Ltd.,
[1964] R.P.C. 463 at 464 (Scot.) [hereinafter Bowmaker].
23
Alexander,supra note 7 at 755; and Sampson v. Brokensha & Shaw Ltd (1935), 37 WA.LR.
90 at 92 (S.C. of W. Aust.).

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 31 NO. 4

sources, without any skill or effort. Thus, in Australia, a judge was
unwilling to find originality in simple directions on how to use a proxy
form, without first hearing evidence on how much of the work was
original and "how much was itself taken from other previous versions of
similar forms." 24
American courts have elaborated this theme. Since the early
1970s, sellers of business forms have been unable to claim copyright for
personal property security agreements, receipts, or guarantees, which
were compiled using standard lawyers' form books. Whether a lawyer
does the drafting,25 or the forms are put to uses a layperson might think
novel,26 is irrelevant. The work of drafters or compilers who produce
such "unoriginal" work, with "negligible efforts," and as "nothing more
than a mosaic of the existing forms, with no original piece added," is free
7
for the taking 2
"Original" forms-the result of original legal research or some
non-trivial variant on the past-do, however, have copyright in the U.S.,
even when produced by non-lawyers. For example, a business college
major with a banking background went into the business of selling forms
to banks. He worked hard and long to produce a useful bank loan form
quite different from past forms. An American judge said he had done
enough "original" work to be entitled to a copyright and to stop a rival
form seller from duplicating the form. 28
Unfortunately, there is no litmus test for originality. Judges
continue to call it a question of fact, depending on fact and degree,
which tells us almost nothing. American judges have recently demanded
some evidence of creativity before finding originality. In practice, this
has meant that a telephone directory's white pages have not been
protected (too mundane),29 but its yellow pages have (a work of
creativity if ever there was).3 0 Somewhere on the spectrum between
white and yellow, originality kicks in. Canadian courts are no more
revealing. Presumably, a judge who thinks a work deserves protection
24

FAIInsurwgw

25

M.M.Business Forms Corp. v. Uarco, Inc, 472 F.2d 1137 at 1140 (6th Cir. 1973).
Donald v. Uarco Business Forms,478 F.2d 764 at 766 (8th Cir. 1973).

26
27

supra note 15 at 140-41.

Donald v. ZackMeyer's T.V Sales & Service, 426 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1970).

28

ProfessionalSystems & Supplies Inc. v. Databank Supplies & Equipment Co., 202 U.S.P.Q.
693 at 696 (W.D. Okl. 1979).
29
30

FeistPublicationsInc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991).

BellsouthAdvertising & Publishing Corp.v. Donnelly InformationPublishingInc., 19 U.S.P.Q.
2d 1345 (11th Cir. 1991).
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will call it original, and vice versa. This folds into the policy question of
how much, if any, protection such documents should have. We return to
this shortly.
III. MORAL RIGHTS
"Moral rights," as used in copyright law, describe the rights an
author has to control the way in which her work is presented to the
public. For example, the author may wish to claim a by-line or preserve
the integrity of her work.31 These rights, while applying more obviously
to fine art and belles lettres, may also affect legal documents. A
well-drafted legal document obviously follows the canons of good
writing, but it is primarily a functional, not an aesthetic, work. The
application of moral rights must take this into account 3 2
A. Right ofAttribution
The author of a legal document may occasionally have the right
to claim a by-line for it, for example, where it appears in a compilation
she has edited, where it is a blank form the author is selling and her
name appears on it as author or copyright owner, or where she is a joint
author and someone else is claiming sole credit.
The occasion to claim a by-line elsewhere will be rare. In the
case of private documents drafted by a lawyer, the name of the lawyer or
her firm that appears on them indicates responsibility for the document,
to advise whom to contact if queries arise, and, no doubt, partly as
advertising. But it is not there to indicate authorship. This can be seen
most clearly where it is the law firm's name that appears. A firm may
own copyright in the document but, except for the rare case where all the
partners contributed to the wording of the document, the firm is not the
author,and only an author can claim a moral right 3
31 CopyrightAc supranote 6, ss. 14.1, 28.1, and 28.2.
32

John Maryon InternationalLtd. v. New Bnmswick Telephone Co. (1982), 141 D.L.L (3d) 193
at 248-49 (N.B.C.A.).
33 The moral rights of junior lawyers may not always be respected by the firm that employs
them. A senior partner may sometimes take the credit for a junior's work by suppressing the
identity of the true author. The partner would probably claim that the junior has impliedly
consented to her attribution right being waived. The quality of this consent is probably the same as
that which informs the rest of the junior's relationship with her firm. If it is any consolation, Lord
Kenyon had the same problem 200 years ago when he worked for a senior barrister, see D. Vaver,
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B. Right of Integrity
Situations in which the author can prevent alterations to the
document will be equally rare. Where the document retains the author's
by-line, the author can presumably prevent alterations that would
prejudice her reputation when seemingly made by her; otherwise people

might wrongly think she authored or endorsed the changes. Sometimes
a claim for defamation might also be possible.

It is difficult to envisage a successful claim to maintain a
document's integrity, where the document does not carry the author's
by-line. Legal documents are regularly changed to suit their users'
specific needs. The author anticipates, and so impliedly licenses, this. 34
The adaptor cannot be expected to consider the author's literary
reputation as he makes changes, and in any event it is difficult to see
how any changes could reflect on the original author.
IV. INFRINGEMENT

Anyone who copies a copyrighted legal document fully or
substantially, or publishes, faxes, or translates an unpublished document,
infringes copyright in the document, unless he can justify the act. The
main defences or justifications occur where the copier:
has the copyright owner's express or implicit consent; 35
can rely on a specific exemption, such as fair dealing; 36
wishes to use the idea of the document, but cannot practically
avoid taking the expression; 37 or
can show a business or professional custom, or a public policy
reason, that allows copying. 38
"Authors' Moral Rights-Reform Proposals in Canada: Charter or Barter of Rights for Creators?"
(1987) 25 Osgoode Hall LJ.749 at 764, note 44.
34 Courts in copyright cases use the "implied licence" technique quite frequently when they
think that a copyright owner is trying to exercise her rights too extensively. See, for example,
Netupsky v. Dominion Bridge Co. (1971), [1972] S.C.R. 368 [hereinafter Netupsky].
35
36

Copyright.Act supranote 6, s. 27(1). On implied licence, see Netupsky, ibid.
CopyrightAc4 ibid., s. 27(2)(a) and (a.1), as inserted by the NAFTA Act, supra note 5, s.

64(1).
37 Copyright protects only the expression of ideas, and not the ideas themselves. See, for
example, Cuisenairev. South West Imports Ltd. (1968), [1969] S.C.R. 208 at 211-12; and supra note
13 and accompanying text.
38 For examples, see infra note 45.
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An infringer does not escape liability by saying he is giving away,
not selling, the copies, or by making minor changes to the document. In
one extraordinary case in the 1840s, the Scottish Law Society decided
that it would recommend some redesigned "styles" (legal forms) needed
to cope with new conveyancing legislation for general use. These had
been produced by one of its lawyer members, William Alexander, who
had compiled them into a book he was selling. Instead of simply
recommending Alexander's book to its members, the society printed a
report appending the styles, with minor amendments, to circulate free of
charge to its members. Alexander obtained an injunction ordering the
society to desist. The society's defences, that it was not acting for profit
and that its styles were different, both failed. One judge said of the
second defence:
Any merely colourable changes on the titles of the several styles, or verbal transmutations

of no essential importance (made to evade the complainer's claim), can be of no avail to
the respondents [the Society]; such changes as I, A.B. (name and designation of cedent), to

I, A.B., merchant in Edinburgh;or the sum of (insertsum), to the sum of L. _; or from
(insert date), to -day of _;

are too frivolous to be regarded as indicative of any thing

but the pretence of change, the substance remaining unaltered.3 9

Since this decision, it has never been doubted that legal
documents deserve copyright protection, at least in some instances.
A. Do Improvements Infringe?
It will not generally matter if the copier has improved the source
work; if he has taken a substantial part of it then he may still infringe
copyright. In Alexander, the point was not directly in issue, because the
judges thought the Scottish Law Society had, if anything, made the styles
worse. 40 But two judges dealt in passing with improvements. One
analogized from the patent law, where even a patentable improvement
to a patented invention may nevertheless still infringe the earlier patent,
adding:
if there had been some of these styles which required correction in order to constitute a
good body of styles, the respondents [the Society] could have made some compensation
to Mr. Alexander for his labour, in so far as they availed themselves of it; or, on the other

hand, they should have allowed him to adopt their suggestions. 4 1

39

Alexander, supra note 7 at 755, note 3 [some original punctuation omitted, emphasis added].

40 iM
41

Ibi. at 760.

672
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The other judge said that improvements might give the second work a
"new character" and so would not infringe. He analogized from the case
of an improved copy of a sea chart 42 that did not infringe copyright
because it was, unlike its mistake-laden source, useful to mariners:
For to what danger of shipwreck, at least to what storms and tempests of litigation, may
not parties be subjected in that adventure of their property which they make in
transferring or acquiring, or in granting securities over it? f therefore, great, and
material, and essential improvements were to be made in the matter of styles, to avoid
risks incident on the use of the original styles, I rather think the party making such
improvements would be entitled to use those original styles in preparing his improved
styles.43

To update this example, what would happen today if a published
book included a form of agreement that inadvertently contravened a
statute and which, if used, would result in an unenforceable contract?
We would hope that any lawyer noticing the fault should be encouraged
to contact the author or publisher so the error could be corrected and
users notified. If the action taken is ineffective, what would be wrong in
a conscientious lawyer or law society-or any one, for that
matter-circulating a corrected version of the form, whether free of
charge or for profit? The copyright owner would have only herself to
blame for this state of affairs.
Reaching this conclusion in copyright law requires, however,
some fancy footwork. Three alternative arguments seem plausible:
- the improving copier does not infringe copyright because, where
the original form is worse than valueless, the copier does not
take a qualitatively substantial part of the form book.44
- it is against public policy for an infringement suit to succeed.
The claimant's inaction harms the public and the copier has,
from moral necessity, rectified the copyright owner's failure.45

42

Sayre v. Moore (1785), 1 East. 361n (K.B.).

43

AIexander, supra note 7 at 761. Whether a court would be as tolerant towards the "copyingbut-improving" cartographer today is less certain.
44
CopyrightAc4 supra note 6, s. 3(1) provides that copyright is infringed only where the whole
work or "a substantial part" of it is taken. What is substantial depends on the quality, more than the
quantity, of what is taken. Courts may factor in their view of the desirability of the parties' conduct
in deciding whether a taking is "substantial." On some of the relevant factors in deciding what is
substantial, see D. Vaver, "Dramatic and Musical Reproductions and Performances: Copyright and
Performers' Rights and Their Implications for Educators" (1991) 6 I.PJ. 239 at 251-53.
45 A public policy defence, borrowed from British practice, is available in copyright
infringement cases. See, for example, R. v. James Loramer& Co. (1984), 77 C.P.R. (2d) 262 at 273
(Fed. CA.); Ontario (AG.) v. Gowing& Henderson (1984), 12 D.LR. (4th) 623 (Ont H.CJ.); and
British Columbia Jockey Club v. Standen (1985), 22 D.LR. (4th) 467 at 472 (B.C.C.A.). However,
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the improver is dealing fairly with the first form for the purposes
of criticism. 46 The improver need not have criticism as his sole
purpose, but apparently may not criticize by implication; some
express criticism of the first form must be included. 47 The
improver must also mention on the improved form the first form
and its author's name. 48

B. CopyrightOwner's Consent
Copyright is obviously not infringed where the copyright owner
has expressly consented to the act. Implied consent is just as effective; 49
if the copyright owner can expect reasonable users to do certain things
with her work, given its character, she impliedly consents to those
uses-unless, of course, she has explicitly forbidden them.
On this theory, a person may copy a blank form bought and used
specific
transaction, if this is necessary to complete the
for a
50
transaction.
Similarly, proxy forms set out in a corporation's
constitution can be copied and used by anyone wishing to take part in
the corporation's affairs. 51 But this does not mean a copier can
legitimately acquire one blank form and then run off copies to use
generally as he wishes.
If legal forms appear in a published book, buyers and readers are
obviously entitled to read and learn from them. Again, they may copy
the whole or part of the form for specific transactions; that is the avowed
purpose of the book, unless the copyright owner has made the contrary
clear. 52 Buyers and readers cannot, however, print or publish any form,
for use gratis or commercially, unless the copyright owner has allowed
them to s
the contours of this defence are rn-defined.
46
CopyrightAc4 supra note 6 at s. 27(2)(a), as inserted by the NAFTA Ac4 supra, note 5, s.
64(1).
47

Sillitoe v. McGraw-HillBook Co. (UK), [1983] F.S.R. 545 (Ch.).

48 CopyrightAc4 supra note 6, s. 27(2)(a.1), as inserted by the NAFTA Ac4 supra note 5, s.
64(1).
49

Netupsky, supra note 34.

50

Real EstateInstitute of N.S.W. v. Wood (1923), 23 S.R. (N.S.W.) 349 at 353-54 (C.. in Eq.).
FAllnsurances supra note 15 at 140-41.

51

52AmearinInstitute ofArchitectsv. Fenichel,41 F.Supp. 146 at 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
53

Alexander, supra note 7 at 754-55, note 3.
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C. Ideas/Expression
The idea underlying a legal document is always free for the
taking, since copyright law protects only the way in which the idea is
expressed. But drafting legal documents is not like writing literature.
To express intentions clearly, the drafter will suppress stylistic
individualism. She may favour time-worn phrases and terms of art.
Once the intention-the idea-of a document is gathered, the drafter
may, in practice, utilize a limited range of structures and language in
which to express it.
Two drafters working independently will differ in the detail of
their expression but, if they are doing their job, their drafts should be
similar. Certainly, they should not be as different as, for example,
William Shakespeare's and Leonard Bernstein's respective treatments of
the idea of star-crossed young lovers trying to persevere in the face of
the enmity of their families. The drafter who expresses a business
contract in rhyming couplets or observing the dramatic unities is
destined for a short career, at least in law.
Some legal forms, therefore, are like the rules in the sweepstake
contest discussed in Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co.,54 where the
judges denied all copyright protection:
When the copyrightable subject matter is very narrow, so that 'the topic necessarily
requires' ... if not only one form of expression, at best only a limited number, to permit
copyrighting would mean that a party or parties, by copyrighting a mere handful of forms,
could exhaust all possibilities of future use of the substance. In such circumstances it
does not seem accurate to say that any particular form of expression comes from the
subject matter. However, it is necessary to say that the subject matter would be
appropriated by permitting the copyrighting of its expression. We cannot recognize
copyright as a game of chess in which the public can be checkmated. 55

Other forms may have copyright, but the scheme they implement
or the style in which they are written (for example, plain language rather
than legalese) should be free for the taking. Despite this, pre-trial
injunctions were granted in Scotland to stop the copying of one or two
provisions in documents drafted to make the financing of purchases
attractive by taking advantage of a tax loophole.5 6 The provisions were
central to the scheme and so no doubt a substantial part of it. Yet how
54 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967).
55
Ibid. at 678-79, apparently approved in Les PromotionsAtlantiques v. HardcraftIndustries
Ltd. (1987), 17 C.P.R. (3d) 552 at 555-56 (Fed. T.M.), where the court queries the copyrightability of
simple instructions on how to operate a carwash brush.
56 LombanA; supra note 8 at 469; Bowmaker, supra note 22 at 465.
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could someone take their idea, which copyright law permits, without
"substantially" or "colourably" copying their expression? The copier
presumably found some way around this prohibition, perhaps by
changing a few words or phrases. But to grant temporary judicial
monopolies until competitors rewrite a document not only gives the
established firm a competitive advantage, but also misses the point that
there are both legal and aesthetic differences between the words of
Walter Scott, legal drafter, and those of Walter Scott, author of Rob Roy.
V. PUBLIC POLICY
A court occasionally finds a work unoriginal or finds the copier's
acts impliedly licensed by the copyright owner, where the real reason for
allowing the copying is that the activity is customary and that it should
occur in the public interest, whether or not the copyright owner agrees.
Judges are, however, traditionally reluctant to discuss questions of public
policy directly; politics are supposedly not their concern. Instead, they
act covertly by manipulating concepts that achieve the desired result.
Nothing clear or certain emerges from this.
This is apparent in our earlier discussion of originality. As
experts in legal documents, judges feel comfortable labelling some legal
work as unoriginal, more so than they would in cases involving the arts,
where they are not expert. But, even if legal documents are judged
differently from works of literature, nobody can tell in advance what
quality or quantity of work, skill, judgment, research, or time a judge will
demand before calling a document original. Quantitative and qualitative
tests for originality are notoriously unpredictable and to avoid them
wherever possible is a good idea. As a legal technique, it might be better
instead to accept all legal documents a person produces, without
slavishly copying a prior form, as original to that person. Judges could
then concentrate more on the real questions at stake: not how high the
copyright threshold should be, but rather when, by whom, and how far
copyright should be asserted. "When" and "by whom" are sometimes
easily answerable. Authors and their publishers should not suffer
because the work they produce is a book of legal documents. Like
copyright owners of other sorts of useful compilations, they make public
work that otherwise might not be circulated widely, or at all. Similarly,
sellers of blank forms, who invest time and cost in creating their product,
also deserve protection from competing copiers who avoid those initial
costs. It does not follow from this that lawyers, their clients or
businesses generally ought to be allowed to prevent competition from
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other lawyers or businesses, by asserting copyright in legal forms. These
issues cannot be adequately resolved by relying on courts to manipulate
accurately the concepts of originality or implied licence. The issues
should be addressed directly.
A. Lawyers and Copyright
It is rare for a lawyer to complain that another lawyer has taken
her legal form. Speaking of professions generally, a sociologist observes:
[t]he ethics governing colleague relationships demand behavior that is cooperative,
equalitarian, and suppbrtive. Members of a profession share technical knowledge with
each other. Any advance in theory and practice made by one professional is quickly
disseminated to colleagues through the professional associations. The proprietaryand
quasi-secretive attitudes toward discovery and invention prevalent in the industrialand
commercialworld areout ofplace in the professionaL57 [emphasis added]

This is true of lawyers and copyright. From their days as
apprentices, lawyers customarily amass their own file of useful forms,
usually with their employer's encouragement, copying from the
employer's files, or from other documents crossing their desk. These
files become part of the stock-in-trade a lawyer takes with her from firm
to firm and job to job.58 As a matter of professional conduct, no lawyer
should normally impede the use another lawyer might wish to make of a
document the former has drafted. The second lawyer, if he is doing his
job, does not simply copy the form; he decides whether and how far it
suits his client's purposes and tailors it accordingly. This involves a
separate exercise of professional skill and judgment. To interfere would
detract from the profession's obligation to serve the public to the best of
its ability.
This is especially so where a particular clause or form has been
litigated and received judicial approval. The public interest is disserved
if the drafter can use her copyright to force other lawyers to adopt
different language and risk a different effect for a legal act. Nor should
she be able to sit back and rake in royalties from those who want to use
"her" clause or form. The lawyer who drafts the perfect document is
merely returning to the profession the result of the accumulated

57 R. Greenwood, "Attributes of a Profession" (1957) 2:3 Social Work 44-55, reprinted in
H.M. Vollmer & D.L Mills, eds., Professionalization(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966)
10 at 15.
58 Merryweather v. Moore, [1892] 2 Ch. 518 at 525; and Lamb v. Evans (1892), [1893] 1 Ch. 218
at 231.
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knowledge and experience it has given her. Logically, this means that a
lawyer should be unable to sue another lawyer's client; otherwise, the
free use of forms is discouraged and a form of unethical competition for
clients is promoted. More broadly, allowing litigation would violate the
professional ethic of solidarity, since "professional colleagues must
support each other vis-h-vis clientele and community. The professional
must refrain from acts which jeopardize the authority of colleagues."5 9
Whether a lawyer should be able to sue anyone at all over a form
produced for a particular client is more difficult. A lawyer needs no
encouragement from copyright to do the best for her client, nor should
she seek adventitious reward from those laws beyond her professional
fees. Moreover, from a social perspective, the means by which particular
legal ends can be effectively achieved should normally be transparent
and available for all to use. To adjust copyright to accommodate these
principles, a scheme along the following lines could be devised:
- the lawyer ought probably to have a final say over whether her
document should be commercially published or otherwise
publicly issued,60 but her estate's ability to exercise this right in
perpetuity, as the CopyrightAct permits for other unpublished
literary work, 61 seems unjustifiable. The estate might be given a
limited time, perhaps five years after the author's death, to
decide whether or not to publish. The standard copyright term
of fifty years after publication for posthumous works would then
apply.6 2 If the estate did not publish within this time, the
documents should be free for anyone to publish or should be
made available under a compulsory licence. 63

59

Greenwood, supra note 57.
60 Documents appearing on public registers are still considered "unpublished" under
copyright law, if they are produced only for private clients. Publication means "the issue of copies
of the work to the public" or, after 1 January 1994, "making copies of the work available to the
public." CopyrightAct, supra note 6, s. 4(1), and as amended by the NAFTA Act,supranote 5,s. 56.
61
s. 7, as amended by the NAFTA Act ibiS, s. 58. The estate can always
Copyight Act; biaS,
exercise its rights of ownership and privacy over private drafts the lawyer had kept to hersel, and so

prevent publication by this means. The discussion in the text applies only to documents the lawyer
had used professionally.

The Copyright Act has some provisions allowing compulsory licensing where the reasonable
demands of the Canadian market are not being met, but this applies only topub/ished works; see,
for example, s. 16(1). A similar provision allowed compulsory licensing for any published works
after an author's death (s. 15), but this was repealed by the NAFTA Act, s.61.
62

63

CopyightAct bid, s. 7, as amended by the NAFTA Act, ibi, s. 58.

The publisher would need to delete any reference that might identify the lawyer's clients, to
avoid infringing their right of privacy; see PrinceAlbertv. Strange (1849), 1 Mac. & G. 25 (Ch.).
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lawyers should be encouraged to publish their forms without
fearing another will publish a rival version. Copyright law should
protect them in this endeavour.6
a lawyer who does not authorize publication of her forms should,
however, be unable to claim copyright against anyone who comes
across her document and reproduces, adapts, or uses it in the
class of transaction it was designed for.
This last suggestion runs contrary to a relatively recent
Australian case. 65 A lawyer devised a tax avoidance scheme that proved
popular with some of his clients. To this end, he drafted a trust deed
and a set of company articles of association. A seller of life insurance
came and asked him for a copy of the documents. The lawyer gave him
a copy and some general advice about tax avoidance schemes. When the
seller reproduced the documents for his own clients, the lawyer claimed
the seller was both using secret information the lawyer had given him
and infringing the lawyer's copyright. The first claim failed because the
information in the deed and articles was not secret. Legal documents
generally become public knowledge because, even when they are not
filed in public registries, clients may disclose them as they choose.
Similarly, documents may also fall into the hands of other lawyers and
their clients in non-confidential circumstances. The claim for copyright
infringement, however, succeeded and the seller was enjoined from
further using the forms. It seems odd that a seller of investments needs the consent of a
lawyer to use publicly known or available documents for which the
lawyer has already received payment from his clients. It seems even
odder that the lawyer could charge whatever royalty he liked or refuse
consent outright. If he refused, then the seller would have to take advice
from another lawyer. If the discussion earlier in this section is accepted,
the second lawyer could reproduce the form. The Australian court's
decision can then be seen as a sympathetic attempt to shore up the legal
profession's monopoly over drafting legal documents. If, contrary to the
theory suggested, the second lawyer must, under copyright law, express
the second document differently, although to the same effect, needless
diversity is encouraged where standardization seems particularly
beneficial.
-

64
65

Aexander, supranote 7 at 754-55, note 3.
O'Brien v. Komesaroff (1982), 41 Aust. LRL 255 (Aust. H.C.).
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B. LitigationBetween Competitors
The motive for some copyright infringement litigation dealing
with legal documents has been to slow down or foil the entry of a
competitor into a market, where the new entrant has copied a legal
document important to successful competition. Judges trying these
cases have not always been careful in preventing copyright law from
becoming a weapon of harassment or restraint of trade. 66
Should any producer of a legal document be able to prevent it
from being copied by a rival where the producer is not selling the form
itself, but is simply using it to garb a product both want to sell? If the
document is drafted by a lawyer, whether independent or in-house, then
the lawyer should not be able to claim copyright for the reasons
mentioned in the previous section. Why should the claim of the client
(after getting an assignment of copyright from the lawyer) or of the
employer be better than the author's? The business itself may be, or
claim to be, a profession-as is common where financial services are
offered-in which case, the arguments on professional conduct made in
relation to lawyers apply equally. They do not directly apply to nonprofessional businesses where employees, who are not lawyers, draft the
documents.
The closest this point has come to judicial consideration
occurred in the U.S. case of Merritt Forbes& Co. v. Newman Investment
Securities Inc. 67 A bond-seller claimed it could prevent others from
copying a type of bond it had devised. At first instance, the judge
refused to strike out defences based on standardization and an industry
practice of pooling knowledge. This seems a good move. Financial
innovation needs no stimulus from copyright, nor should copyright
hinder competition in financial markets, especially since everyone is free
to copy the idea behind a new instrument. Such markets benefit from
standardization; forcing competitors to "draft around" creates needless
deadweight costs and uncertainties. The practical conclusion is that
judges should not readily grant pre-trial injunctions in these cases; and,
if the cases come to trial, they should take especial care not to let
copyright unduly distort market competition.

66 Su for example, LombankA supra note 8 at 469; and Bowmaker,supra note 22 at 465.
67604 NSupp. 943 at 949-52 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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VI. REMEDIES
Remedies for copyright infringement can be as severe as, or even
more severe than, the remedies available for infringing any property
right: damages, accounts of profits, injunctions, and remedies for
conversion or detinue in respect of infringing copies.68 The preceding
discussion suggests that courts should be most circumspect in the
remedies they award when copyright is asserted in legal documents.
Copyright protection here is often adventitious and its implications are
largely unexplored. In particular, pre-trial injunctions should be granted
only if people are not discouraged from copying the scheme or ideas of
the document. The more succinctly a scheme is expressed, the more
likely an injunction will create a monopoly in the scheme itself; and
temporary monopoly is still monopoly. Scottish courts overlooked this,
as already noted, in enjoining the copying of a clause or two in some
financing documents. 69 An Australian court did somewhat better in
denying pre-trial relief to one faction in a proxy fight against another
faction that had copied proxy directions in which the first claimed
copyright. The judge thought the copyright case was weak; the words
copied were "very ordinary words indeed," there was "no great number
of other ways in which to convey the same information," and the second
drafter had saved only "a slight amount of thought and trouble." 70 Even
if there had been a strong copyright claim, a proxy fight surely should
not be halted for that, any more than a general election should be
invalidated because the votes were cast on ballots that infringed
somebody's copyright. 71
Final relief, too, needs careful attention. An English cooperative
society was granted a declaration that an Irish society had infringed
copyright by copying its by-laws from the claimant, but the court refused
an injunction because the copier's operation would be brought to a
grinding halt. There is, however, a suggestion that an injunction might
have been issued requiring the society's board or members to change the

68

CopyrightAc supra note 6, ss. 34,35, and 38, as amended by the NAFTAAc4 supra note 5.

69

Lombank supra note 8; Bowmaker, supranote 22.

70

FAInsuranc4supra note 15 at 141.
A voting paper can be protected by copyright; see Kenrick & Co. v. Lawrence & Co. (1890),
25 Q.B.D. 99. The judge was, however, careful to limit the scope of protection so as not to impair
the constitutional right to vote.
71
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rules, had they been parties to the litigation. 72 The English society was,
however, in the business of licensing its rules for use by other societies,
so an order that the copier pay damages equal to the normal licence fee,
in addition to the costs of the litigation the court had ordered the copier
to pay, would have done justice.
VII. CONCLUSION
To decide whether legal documents should have some form of
copyright protection is no easy task. We can say the current position,
where all these documents apparently have copyright protection like any
other literary work, is unsatisfactory. It has created a situation in which
nobody can really say how the law applies to activities that occur
routinely. In the end, the activity may be found legitimate, but to do so
requires some tricky manoeuvring to bend the rigid structures of
copyright law to achieve sensible results.
A. Amending the Law
One solution is to give legal documents no protection at all. A
simple amendment to the Copyright Act could achieve that. This is,
however, unlikely to occur. The Canadian policy-makers who said that
business forms should be protected in Canada, although they lack
protection in the U.S.,73 presumably would not be willing to distinguish
between what are, to them, very similar literary works.
A better solution may be to accept that some legal documents
need protection in some circumstances. For example, copyright policy
could fairly offer protection where, without it, producers would decline
to produce documents at all, would produce lower quality or fewer
documents than was socially desirable, or would take costly steps to
prevent copying. Some of these circumstances have been suggested
above but, for policy-making purposes, the circumstances should first be
established through an examination of existing practices. The situations
in which protection was thought necessary would be identified, and the
appropriate level of protection to make up for the shortfall would then
be extended.
72

Coopeative Union, Ltd v. .lmore, Aughrir & Krllucan Daby Society Ltd (1912), 47 Ir.
LT.R.737 at 8-9 (Ch. D.).
' Charerof'Rights,supranote 3 at 17.
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Before the Anglo-American and Canadian copyright reforms of
the early twentieth century and onwards, copyright law tended to deal
with isolated instances. In Britain, books, fine art, music, drama, and
even lectures had their own copyright statutes, tailoring protection
closely to the exigencies of the subject-matter. The search for
rationality, tidiness, and consistency typical of the mid-Victorian era,
created a late nineteenth century movement towards generalization and
reductionism: all creative work should be treated identically. "To each
cow its calf' was the catch-phrase, and the many claimants clamouring
for protection avoided examining too closely whether the animal was
really bovine or an entirely different beast.
In truth, the incrementalism of the eighteenth and early
nineteenth century statutes, which extended copyright step-by-step to
particular subject-matters as each case was made, contained within it
much wisdom. The process recognized that there might be as many laws
of copyright as there were subject-matters deserving protection.
Uniformity was necessary only when proponents could establish that a
particular subject-matter shared another's creative process, and also that
protection would achieve similar desirable social and economic ends.
The idea that some creative work needed no protection, because it
would occur anyway, was not then as heretical as copyright campaigners
would make it seem today. It is now easier to claim that anything that
might be of some use to somebody is potentially valuable and should be
turned into a commodity; and if commodified, it almost goes without
saying that it should be protected.
Perhaps it is time to return to an earlier mindset when dealing
with the question of how far copyright law should protect legal
documents. One could start by presuming that the work should have no
protection. A solid factual case would then be needed before protection
was extended to the work. One should keep an open mind on the type
and duration of protection, and what other infringing activities should be
permitted. If this approach is thought too radical, one might start with
the opposite presumption: the work should be protected like any other
work, and a solid factual case would need to be made for diminishing or
modiring protection where desirable. But this second approach should
no-be simply a way of returning to the status quo ante. Once situations
Jtifing copying are identified, an exemption should be enacted and its
opprion monitored to see whether it should be broadened or widened.'
, -7-Either approach would deal more effectively with the question of,
..howfarcopyright law should protect legal documents than the current .'
;processof extending protection to works by simplistic analogy, ma-ng4
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legal document like a memorandum like a business form like a computer
program.74
B. Guidelines
What should lawyers and judges do pending statutory reform?
The following guidelines, though they may not attract universal support,
at least seem consistent with copyright law and policy, as well as broader
public interests:
- lawyers or their clients should generally be unable to resort to
copyright law to prevent the use of documents drafted as part of
the ordinary duties a lawyer performs for her client. Professional
pride, codes of ethics, and legal standards of care, confidentiality
and fiduciary obligation influence the level of service a lawyer
renders much more than copyright law does. Copyright law
encourages nothing to be done beyond what these aspects of the
client-lawyer relationship already suggest.
- a lawyer should be entitled to claim copyright infringement
against the commercialpublicationof her form separately or in a
book of precedents, or against its being made available on a
public database. Copyright law encourages public dissemination
of knowledge, but the drafter ought to be the one to decide
whether her document is in a form fit for publication, and should
be able to reap the reward of her work. This right should not last
forever. After the lawyer's death, her estate should have a
reasonable time to decide on publication. If it decides not to
publish, then anyone may, while preserving client confidentiality,
publish any forms the lawyer had used professionally, either for
free or upon paying the estate a reasonable royalty.
- the design of legal forms and compilations for publication are
businesses that copyright law can legitimately protect against
some types of unfair competition. Persons engaging in these
businesses can fairly insist that their competitors put their own
money and effort into document and compilation design, and not
simply copy substantial parts of tl~eir competitors' products.
in the last two cases, there should be an exception at least where
a document is faulty. Pointing out and correcting errors in legal
documents should be encouraged in the public interest.
74 It would also deal more effectively with the question of how far copyright law ought to
protect other types of subject-matter. But that is another story.
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Publication of a corrected document should be allowed, as
should publication of the faulty document to the extent necessary
to point out or correct errors.
businesses that do not publish or sell legal documents but use
them as vehicles for products or services they do sell-for
example, financial instruments-should not be able to use the
copyright law to prevent competitors from copying the forms.
Copyright here provides no additional stimulus to innovation. In
practice, too, drafters may have few alternatives available to
express the idea underlying a document. Preventing copying may
end up by protecting ideas-the function of patent, not
copyright, laws-rather than expression. Standardization of
these documents may also be a benefit: the public can choose
between products on their intrinsic merits, and avoid the
artificial differentiations, risks, and costs attendant on rewrites.
judges should avoid spending too much time on the threshold
issue of whether or not a particular form or clause is original.
Where there is no outright copy of an earlier work, it is better to
assume originality and proceed to the question of whether the
copying is justified on policy grounds. Experience has shown
that focusing on originality diverts attention from the real issues
at stake and provides little guidance on how future cases should
be resolved.

C. The Future
For several reasons Parliament is unlikely to deal soon with the
legal documents problem. Copyright reforms are thought to impinge on
culture, a minefield in which Canadian legislators have learned to tread
warily. Solutions that are compact, politically acceptable, and consistent
with Canada's international obligations under the copyright
treaties-and now NAFTA-are increasingly hard to find. Most
legislators would concur with the comment by a British observer:
copyright laws are so "mind-bogglingly complicated that they usually last
at least a generation because few legislators can bear the experience
twice." 75 It is therefore tempting to slough off a subject like copyright
for legal documents as of interest mainly to lawyers, who therefore

75 j Erlicbman, "Lobbyists with Designs on the Complex Art of Copyright" The Guardian (25
July 1988) 2.
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should be the ones to regulate them through their professional
associations.
Law societies would no doubt find it worthwhile to consider the
ethics surrounding the copying of legal documents, but as we have seen,
the problem is more widespread. In commercial arenas, it will be
resolved like other disputes along cost/benefit lines (does the
expectation of profit outweigh the risks of legal entanglement?) and
ultimately litigation. Judges called on to handle these disputes should
recognize that the wording of the Copyright Act does not-indeed
cannot-solve all such questions. What is needed is a particularistic
search for a solution that is tailor-made to the kind of work at issue, that
simultaneously encourages the production of creative work and that
ensures the public fair access and rights of reasonable use. Following
this procedure will adjust rights relating to legal documents-as well as
other works-more efficiently than heroic attempts to "interpret" the
CopyrightAct's opaque language.

